Abstract: Management of our critical infrastructures is a vital component of our economic and homeland security policy. The degree to which these infrastructures are interdependent, due to increasing system complexity and technology, further complicates the task of infrastructure managers to maintain service. In this paper we use economic models of the U.S. economy to identify hidden interdependencies in the supply chains of infrastructure. Critical connections between infrastructure systems, whether direct or indirect, pose a risk of one disruption causing a ripple effect across the economy. Our analysis shows that in many cases, the highest interdependencies between critical infrastructures occur upstream ͑e.g., in the second or third-level of the supply chain͒. Specific results are shown for the large upstream interdependencies ͑up to 10 times the direct dependencies͒ between transportation and power generation sectors. By revealing these upstream interdependencies infrastructure managers can take further preventative measures or make additional investments to avoid future infrastructure disruptions.
Introduction
Critical infrastructures such as water supply, oil, and gas distribution, power plants, telecommunications, and transportation are the foundations of modern society. They support the economic activities in our communities and help to maintain the security, safety, and stability of the whole society. They are essential to our economy, national defense, and quality of life. The desire for higher levels of national security and the survivability of the economy demand protection of our critical infrastructures. However, they are becoming increasingly complex as new technologies are introduced, which makes management of possible vulnerabilities difficult. Not only are these infrastructure systems independently complex, they also form a complicated interrelated network that has proven to be extremely important in predicting the impacts of a disruption.
A critical industry can be thoroughly upset by the breakdown of a network component that is only indirectly related ͑Boin et al. 2003͒ . There are many real-world examples of this type of failure. The 1998 Galaxy 4 communications satellite control failure caused an outage of 80% of all pagers, which then disrupted numerous financial, banking and emergency services ͑Little 2005͒. The September 11 terrorist attacks on U.S. passenger airplanes caused not only a revenue collapse in the air transportation industry as a result of decreased demand, but successive shocks across services related to travel, hotels, finance, insurance, etc. ͑Mendonça and Wallace 2006͒. In addition, growing trends in information technology and globalization have markedly increased the interconnectedness and interdependencies of our critical infrastructures. As new technologies continue to emerge, the dependencies and the tightness of dependencies may change over time. Thus, it is difficult to point to one infrastructure vulnerability and not see the potential cascading impacts. Lack of visibility and control procedures are considered to be the most important factors contributing to system level supply chain risks ͑Cranfield University, School of Management 2002͒. Additionally, the increasing scale of entities involved and the complexity of their connections is a major concern, especially when all economic sectors are considered. There is a pressing need to better understand interconnected large-scale complex systems.
As implied in these examples, a major vulnerability associated with infrastructures is their interdependency. That is, the loss of expected services or functions of one infrastructure could be the result of another's unavailability. An important step in evaluating vulnerability and conducting an effective risk analysis is to understand the underlying relationships among the many subsystems that cause them to interact with one another. A wide range of issues concerning these interdependencies must be addressed in risk assessment and management. Quantitative risk assessment and management is vital, but the models must be capable of representing multiple dimensions and perspectives ͑Haimes and Horowitz 2004͒. Examples include the identification of hidden dependencies within interconnected systems, prediction of the consequences resulting from a disruption of one or more infrastructures, recognition of resource allocation priorities, and preparation of appropriate redundancy to reduce potential vulnerabilities.
This type of analysis and management is made difficult because the interconnections among these infrastructures are intricate and interactive. For example, the operation of water infrastructure depends extensively on other sectors, with the heaviest dependence on the energy sector. Large amounts of electricity are required to run pumps to move water ͑Stokes and Horvath 2006͒ and operate wastewater treatment plants. At the same time, cooling systems within a power plant are not able to work without sufficient water supply ͑Executive Office of the President 2003͒. The result is a circularity effect that may significantly hinder recovery efforts if not recognized.
Several models have been built to help understand these interdependencies. The original Leontief model, developed by Nobel Laureate Wassily Leontief in the 1930's, defines the interconnectedness among the various sectors of an economy and forecasts how a change in one sector will affect the others. The Leontief model takes a disruption in demand for a particular sector and traces the impacts upstream in the supply chain ͑demand-driven propagation͒. Years later, Ghosh ͑1958͒ applied this concept to develop a model for supply-driven propagation, starting with a decrease in one sector's ability to produce and tracing the impacts downstream in the supply chain. Another is Santos and Haimes's Leontief-based infrastructure risk model ͑Santos and Haimes 2004͒. In their model, Santos and Haimes define the concept of "inoperability" which is equivalent to the inability of a system to accomplish its designed functions, such as the extent to which a power plant can supply a required amount of electricity to its customers at a scheduled time.
An input-output ͑I-O͒-based economic model provides a way to trace resources and products within an economy by purchases. The commodity or service flow throughout the economic sectors in a Leontief model represents the physical interconnections among these sectors including the infrastructure sectors. Two infrastructures are physically interdependent if the state of each is dependent on the supply or services provided by the other. Haimes found that a model similar to the original Leontief economic model could be used to evaluate and measure the risk of inoperability in monetary terms caused primarily by internal or external malicious attacks using data from 1992 ͑Haimes et al. 2005a,b͒. In this paper, we investigate the feasibility and adaptability of using such models with updated U.S. economic I-O data, i.e., the 1997 economic transaction values, to explain the interdependencies of critical infrastructures and determine the potential vulnerability faced by these infrastructures. Part of our goal is to better adapt and describe the result of such models so that infrastructure managers and other key stakeholders can better appreciate their dependence on upstream critical infrastructures and make contingency plans or design changes to incorporate this information. Such results must be presented visually in a way that highlights the patterns that emerge. Here we use economic I-O analysis to estimate a broad class of critical infrastructure interdependencies ͑including normal disruptions and natural hazards͒.
Economic I-O Accounts
Economic I-O accounts show how industries interact; specifically, they show how industries provide input to, and use output from, each other to produce gross domestic product ͑Hendrickson et al. 1998͒. I-O data in the U.S. has been collected for over 50 years and is published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis ͑a division of the U.S. Department of Commerce͒. These accounts provide detailed information on the dollar flows of goods and services that make up the production processes of industries. In this study, we use the 1997 industry benchmark Table 1 lists the selected critical infrastructure sectors used in this study ͑and their NAICS codes͒, including transportation, water supply, and power generation and supply; this list is not meant to be exhaustive. Most sectors listed are self-explanatory with the exception of "Information Services," which includes online information services ͑including internet service providers͒, news syndicates, libraries and archives, and other information services.
There are two tables used in this application: the direct requirements table, which shows the dollar amounts of commodity input directly required by an industry to produce a dollar of that industry's output ͑i.e., the purchases made only by the final producer͒, and the total requirements table, which shows all commodity production that is required, both directly and indirectly, from each industry across the supply chain to produce a dollar of industry output to final users ͑i.e., the purchases made by all entities in the supply chain͒. The total requirements table is derived from a Leontief model. Leontief developed models to relate the production of goods and services in an economy to the production outputs of the other sectors, as well as the provision of labor and other inputs. The basic form of these IO models describes an economy only by intersectoral transactions. The Leontief model is considered to be demand-driven because it begins with a sector of interest and examines the economic activity in others upstream that the sector of interest demands from. The I-O framework shows the "direct" economic effects, e.g., the effects from producing the final goods or services ͑such as computer parts͒, and the "indirect" effects, e.g., the effects related to producing all goods and services needed to produce the final demand ͑including as the supply chain of producing computer compo- nents͒. We call the sum of the direct and indirect effects the "total" economic supply chain effect of production. Both the direct and total Leontief requirements matrices used in this research come from the U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of Economic Analysis ͑Bureau of Economic Analysis 2007͒.
A similar method using the same IO data are the supply-driven Ghosh model ͑Ghosh 1958͒. Similar to the Leontief model, it estimates both direct and indirect matrices. However, the Ghoshian model serves as the opposite of the Leontief model, and its interdependency matrix can be derived from the original Leontief matrix. It begins with the input identity and complements it with fixed output coefficients ͑Chen 2006͒. The result is a set of coefficients that indicate how much of a given sector's output is demanded by each economic sector per dollar output downstream from the given sector. It is considered to be supply-driven because the model starts with a sector of interest and examines the impacts within all those sectors whose supply chain includes the sector of interest. While Leontief and Ghosh models are not new, applying them to infrastructure interdependency analysis and assessing their results is a relevant task given emerging management concerns such as disaster and hazard response and planning.
Analysis: Demand and Supply-Driven Economic I-O Models
The inoperability of an infrastructure may be demonstrated in multiple dimensions, such as physical, information, geographical, temporal or political ͑Rinaldi et al. 2001͒. It can also be either demand-driven or supply-driven. Fig. 1 shows how both demand and supply-driven disruptions propagate through the supply chain. Demand-driven inoperability begins with a decrease in demand for one or more commodities produced by a particular sector. The result would be a decrease in demand for any commodities required by that sector ͑upstream in the supply chain͒. For example, a significant reduction in demand for truck transportation will in turn reduce demand in the oil and gas extraction sector ͑Facanha and Horvath 2006͒, as well as the pipeline transportation sector which delivers the fuels. This inoperability could be the result of a change in consumer behavior or external events such as natural disasters. External events can also cause supply-driven inoperability, which refers to the involuntary disruption of a sector's ability to provide goods and services. For example, a disruption in the rail transportation sector may impact the supply of coal to power plants, thus causing inoperability in the power generation and supply sector. Sectors that are dependent on power generation and supply ͑essentially all͒ will then experience some degree of inoperability.
Demand-Driven Inoperability: Leontief Model
In this section we excerpt data pertaining to the critical infrastructure sectors from the broader 491-sector IO tables. Here the Leontief matrix, also known as A ‫ء‬ , is a 491ϫ 491 square matrix that represents the inoperability interdependency of all U.S. economic sectors through demand indices. Described by Haimes et al.
͑2005a͒, A
‫ء‬ is calculated as shown in Eq. ͑1͒
where ͓diag͑X͔͒ = diagonalized version of the X matrix ͑the total output from each sector, or "as-planned output"͒ and A = interdependency matrix, in which each element a ij represents the economic loss in sector i due to loss of $1 million of output from sector j. A ‫ء‬ is simply the normalized version of A. To develop A ‫ء‬ , which is the interdependency matrix measured in terms of inoperability ͑percent reduction in output͒, each element a ij is normalized by a factor of X j / X i where X j is the as-planned productivity for sector j and X i is the as-planned productivity from sector i. Thus, a ij ‫ء‬ at row i, column j can be described as the resulting inoperability of sector i if sector j experiences complete loss of production ͑inoperability= 1͒.
To extend the Leontief model, Haimes and Santos introduced the perturbation vector, denoted as c ‫ء‬ , which is a 491ϫ 1 matrix of assumed fractions of inoperability for each sector ͑Santos and Haimes 2004; Haimes and Jiang 2001͒. For example, 10% inoperability of sector i would correspond to a value of 0.1 in row i. These are combined to produce a 491ϫ 1 final impact vector, q, as shown in Eq. ͑2͒
The result can be expanded to show the breakdown of direct, first-level indirect, as shown in Eq. ͑3͒ 
͑3͒
where I ϫ c ‫ء‬ + A ‫ء‬ ϫ c ‫ء‬ represents the direct impact; A ‫2ء‬ ϫ c ‫ء‬ is the first-level indirect impact; and A ‫3ء‬ ϫ c ‫ء‬ is the second level indirect impact, etc.
From an infrastructure management perspective, the Leontief model is useful for proactive management efforts. In other words, the manager can determine which critical infrastructure systems his/her own system is most dependent on and, based on the likelihood of inoperability in those sectors, identify and take measures to reduce the associated risk. Work to date has shown that infrastructure managers do not appreciate the extent of their dependence on other critical infrastructure systems ͑Chen 2006͒. In a reactive context, the Leontief model can be used to predict reduction in demand for various sectors if a given sector either becomes inoperable or experiences a major reduction in demand. Fig. 2 shows an example of the Leontief model results for the first five levels of the power generation and supply sector's dependence on other critical infrastructures. For insight into how each level is calculated, see Eq. ͑3͒. Clearly, oil and gas extraction is dominant at every level. Other direct purchases include pipeline transportation and rail transportation, which is intuitive because coal is largely transported by rail, while oil and gas are transported by pipeline and, to a lesser extent, truck. At the indirect levels power generation and supply also appears ͑in other words, the sector is indirectly dependent on itself͒. This can be explained by the large electricity requirements in the oil and gas extraction sector. Hence, a large direct dependence on oil and gas extraction translates to a large indirect dependence on electricity production.
Supply-Driven Inoperability: Ghosh Model
Just as the Leontief model is extended to determine demanddriven inoperability, the Ghosh model can be extended to determine the supply-driven inoperability. The Ghosh matrix, known as B ‫ء‬ , is essentially the opposite of the Leontief matrix; it is a 491ϫ 491 square vector where element b ij represents the economic loss in sector j resulting from a $1 million reduction in output from sector i. As proposed by Oosterhaven ͑1988͒, it can be derived from A using Eq. ͑4͒
‫ء‬ is calculated by multiplying the corresponding value from the original B matrix by a normalization factor equal to the ith sector's as-planned productivity over the jth sector's asplanned productivity ͑see Eq. ͑5͒͒, where X is the as-planned economic output of each sector and ͓diag͑X͔͒ is the diagonalization of that vector
Similar to c ‫ء‬ , we use an inoperability vector, v that lists the degree of given inoperability in fractional terms, but it is 1 ϫ 491 ͑a transposed version of c ‫ء‬ ͒. The resulting formula is shown in Eq. ͑6͒
͑6͒
The result can be expanded to show the breakdown of direct, first-level indirect, etc. as well ͑see Eq. ͑7͒͒
= first-level indirect impact; and v ‫ء‬ ϫ B ‫3ء‬ = second level indirect impact. The results from this analysis add a new dimension to that of the Leontief matrix, providing data that can be used in situations where a Leontief analysis may be impractical.
The Ghosh model provides infrastructure managers with information that is particularly useful in cases where reactive actions are required. Given a disruption in one sector due to a natural disaster, terrorist attack, or other major event, infrastructure managers and decision makers can estimate which sectors are likely to be impacted the most. If the greatest dependence occurs at the second supply chain level, for example, the intermediate sector could be determined and provided with the resources needed to continue operating. Fig. 3 shows an example of Ghosh model results for the first five levels of dependence on the power generation and supply sector, where the outer ring represents Level 1 ͑direct dependence͒ and the innermost ring represents Level 5. We can see that sectors whose primary energy source is electricity make up a greater share of the dependence at the first-level ͑pipe-line transportation, for example͒. Conversely, truck transportation depends on petroleum fuels as its primary energy source, so the direct dependence is lower. 
Scenario Analysis
In this section, we show how these graphs and the IO data can be applied to increase awareness for infrastructure managers in two scenarios.
Infrastructure Disruption during California Energy Crisis
The California energy crisis offers many examples of higher order interdependencies within critical infrastructure services ͑Rinaldi et al. 2001͒. The crisis started from a shortage of electricity supply and then produced ripple effects over gas and oil storage and supply networks, as well as transportation and other fundamental services. As described by Rinaldi, "the electricity power disruptions curtailed in-state natural gas production, the operation of petroleum product pipelines transporting gasoline and jet fuels … and the operation of massive pumps used to move water for crop irrigation … Tight natural gas supplies also had the potential to shut down gas-fired industry cogeneration units producing steam for injection into California's heavy oil production … the transportation infrastructure was affected by problems in the electrical grid through the intermediate petroleum distribution and storage network …"
Rinaldi's descriptions illustrate some of the expansive effects of this energy crisis. However, the question is whether these interdependencies can be described with quantitative evidence, thus providing information that will help prevent future ripple effects. In this example, we motivate a detailed investigation based upon the IO data and use visual approaches to identify the crucial connections. Other corresponding IO sectors that represent industries influenced in this crisis are oil and gas extraction, pipeline transportation, air transportation, rail transportation, petroleum refineries, water, sewage, and other systems, etc. Their quantitative interdependencies are explored using the IO requirement data, with the goal of exposing the other potential disruptions and important connections where built-in redundancy could help prevent future widespread crises. In this example, we demonstrate how to examine the most impacted sectors individually and identify their links to the initially disrupted sector.
We begin by focusing on the interdependence of power generation and transportation systems. Using the 491-sector 1997 benchmark IO data in a Leontief model ͑Carnegie Mellon University Green Design Institute 2007͒, producing $1 million of service in the rail transportation industry requires only $700 of electric power directly. This is a number that infrastructure managers are likely aware of. However, the total supply chain dependence between the rail transportation sector and the power generation sector is equal to $7,500 per $1 million, which is more than 10 times the direct dependence. This larger total requirement is caused by $3,000 of "second level upstream" electricity purchases and $1,900 of "third-level upstream" purchases. In Fig. 4 , we develop a so-called "Nth order graph" to better present the dependence of the rail transportation industry on the power generation and supply sector across various levels of the supply chain. This result suggests that a large amount of indirect dependencies are hidden below their direct connections and are formed by the involvement of many intermediate sectors. This also implies that managers of rail transportation infrastructure are likely not aware of these indirect connections, and their relative magnitude. To understand why there is a high second level dependence, we can use the Ghosh model to examine the dependence patterns for other modes of transportation.
Other transportation sectors, such as rail, truck, and water transportation produce a similar pattern. Fig. 5 shows each sector's demand per million dollars of output from the Power Generation and Supply sector across the supply chain. Fig. 6 shows the total demand as a percentage of the given sector's total direct 1997 purchases ͑from all economic sectors͒. This is a better measure of a sector's dependence on electric power since it takes into account the size of the industry.
It is notable that while Fig. 5 and 6 are similar, impact from pipeline transportation is much larger than those of other sectors in terms of dependence as a percentage of direct purchases. This implies that while its dollar-value of dependence may be relatively low, this vitally important sector is actually more dependent on electric power than other transportation infrastructures. It is also interesting to note that its highest dependence is on the first, or direct, level. This makes sense because, unlike other sectors that use liquid fuels as energy inputs, pipelines use electricity to pump water and other materials.
These graphs imply that all transportation sectors except pipeline are not heavily dependent on electricity at the first-level, but directly demand from one or more sectors that are electricityintensive. A common trait among these sectors is a dependence on petroleum fuels as the primary energy source. In contrast, pipeline transportation uses electricity as its primary energy source. An Nth order graph for petroleum refineries ͑see Fig. 7͒ reveals a large dependence on electricity at both the first and second levels. To produce $1 million of petroleum refinery product, approxi- mately $11,400 in electricity is purchased by direct transactions. However, the total requirement for electricity is around $31,500, or about three times the direct dependence. Fig. 7 plots the dependence of petroleum refineries on power generation and supply using the Nth order graph. It is shown that the dependence at the second level ͑$12,100͒ is even higher than it is at the first-level ͑$11,400͒.
Using these results, we can predict that our major transportation systems could be affected extensively by the shortage of oil and gas as the indirect result of an electricity shortage. Therefore, improving oil and gas inventory levels appropriately would be a practical and effective risk mitigation measure to prepare for an unexpected electricity blackout. Petroleum extraction and refining facilities could also be equipped with redundancy in the form of backup generators to protect their operation in the event of a blackout. Moreover, this knowledge may have implications for electricity policy. The California Public Utilities Commission ruled in April 2001 that utilities must include transmission level customers, such as petroleum refineries, in rotating outages ͓En-ergy Information Administration ͑EIA͒ 2001͔. A Ghosh model is capable of estimating which industries will be most impacted by such a decision, directly and indirectly. The dependence of the petroleum refinery industry on power supply can be further explored with a hierarchical tree, which reveals some crucial intermediate linkages between the petroleum refineries and the electricity sector.
The hierarchical tree starting from the petroleum refinery sector ͑see Fig. 8͒ illustrates how the dependence between these two sectors is developed and facilitates the identification of the hidden connection. Fig. 8 plots the dependencies in the first two levels. Eight sectors that contribute more than $10,000 to petroleum refinery production are depicted in the first-level. Their dependencies on the electric power sector are depicted in the second level. Note that the direct dependence between the petroleum refinery sector ͑Sector 142͒ and the power generation and supply sector ͑Sector 30͒ is around $11,400 per $1 million production of petroleum refinery products. The petroleum refineries sector requires a significant amount of electric power directly, but also heavily relies on oil and gas extraction, which is also an electricityintensive sector, creating several large indirect dependencies on power. For example, the refinery sector's indirect demand for power ͑No. 30͒ through the oil and gas sector ͑No. 19͒ is $9,040, or around 79% of the direct dependence ͑$11,400͒.
The dependence between petroleum refineries and electricity . Nth order graph of petroleum refinery dependence on power generation and supply ͑Leontief-based results͒ through pipeline transportation service providers is also nonnegligible. Pipeline is the main transportation mode for petroleum products, and electric power is needed to pump those products. As a practical matter, although there are exceptions, a significant electrical outage anywhere in a pipeline system typically results in the shutdown of that entire line for the duration of the outage and refinery production can be heavily affected. Therefore, it can be predicted that insufficient supply of electricity or the fluctuation of electricity prices would potentially affect the production of petroleum refineries. Aside from the infrastructures discussed above, other sectors such as water, telecommunications, etc., all interact with the electric power industry. For example, $16,700 of electricity is required to power water pump stations and other water system activities to produce $1 million service. This number increases to $21,500 when the total supply chain effect is taken into account. The operation of massive pumps is used to move water for crop irrigation. Clean water is pumped by wells and transported to individual residences and businesses through pumping stations throughout the state. Likewise, wastewater is sent to the sewer plant by similar pumping stations. Most of those pumping stations are operated by electrical power. Therefore, during blackouts, discontinuing the use of water will help to conserve water pressure for fire fighting or other emergencies and keep sewer lines from overflowing, which makes the need to conserve both water and electricity even more important.
Data Processing Center and Infrastructures
Much of the discussion in the previous scenario centered around publicly owned and operated infrastructures. While protection of critical infrastructures requires the effort of government and infrastructure operators, it also calls for cooperation of private corporations. The connection between a generic enterprise and public utility are not always obvious, but a significant dependence can exist in both directions. Here, by treating the data processing service industry as a collection of private establishments, we explore the quantitative dependencies this sector has on our infrastructures, and the importance of this reliance. The sector "Data Processing Services" from the IO model is chosen to represent this industry and while it is not included in the core list of critical infrastructures established in this paper, it carries great economic importance and provides an interesting case study. This industry ͑Data Processing, Hosting, and Related Services, NAICS code number: 514200͒ is comprised of establishments primarily engauged in hosting or data processing services. Major users of electronic data processing systems are banks, public utilities, transportation and insurance companies, large manufacturing firms, and government and educational establishments. Table 2 shows the requirements from 10 major infrastructure sectors required to produce $1 million of output in the data processing sector and how their relative dollar-value dependency rankings change depending on whether direct or total supply chain depen- dence is measured. The infrastructure sectors whose ranking positions are improved are labeled with "+" in the "Total Requirement," "Rank" column in Table 2 . Generally, the dependencies on these critical infrastructures increase when the total supply chain is considered. Air transportation is one of the major modes of transportation chosen by service sectors like data processing because of its speed, while other indirectly connected sectors may depend more on other transportation modes. The telecommunications sector, which is primarily engauged in operating, maintaining, and/or providing access to facilities for the transmission of voice, data, text, sound, and video, keeps the position of the top required service among both the direct and total requirement table because reliable, stable and smooth communication approaches are highly demanded in the operation of data processing service. Computerrelated manufacturing, such as computer peripheral equipment manufacturing and electronic equipment manufacturing, postal services, building service, and power generation supply are all among the top 10 heavily directly demanded sectors from this industry.
Among the chosen infrastructure sectors, oil and gas extraction and pipeline transportation increased significantly. The direct requirement as determined by the Leontief model from oil and gas extraction is only $5 for making $1 million of computer products, but that dependence increases to $3,200 over the total supply chain. Aside from the huge energy consumption required to make and assemble computer parts, shipping the finished products also requires significant energy input, which makes oil and gas the most pervasive and important energy sources for supporting the normal operation of this data processing industry. The requirement on truck and rail transportation is also increased; this can be attributed to the large amount of peripheral equipment or raw material transported by truck. Oil and gas distribution become important as well, because a high energy demand translates to a significant dependence on the distribution of fuels required by electric power plants.
A similar analysis can be conducted for any other sector, such as banking, financial services, insurance, health care, etc. It can be expected that their dependence on critical infrastructures will become outstanding when the total supply chain effect is considered.
Discussion
In this paper, we discuss the adaptability of Leontief and Ghosh economic models, coupled with economic I-O data, for analysis of interdependencies among connected critical infrastructure economic sectors. The interdependencies among these infrastructures present the possibility of ripple and circularity effects, both of which increase the vulnerability of our society as a whole. The IO data provides a high-level, quantitative representation of the monetary transactions, which are related to flow of physical products or services, within these sectors. This can assist infrastructure managers and decision makers in prioritizing emergency response efforts and investing in system redundancies that will be most effective in mitigating interdependency-borne risk, and in better understanding their total supply chain risks.
Infrastructure Vulnerability
The interdependence among infrastructures is a result of increasing system complexity and the reduction of redundancies. While from a cost perspective this may be the optimal structure, these interdependencies increase the risk of widespread infrastructure failure. Increasing substitutability, and building redundancy into especially critical system components are both valid approaches to mitigating this risk. As production becomes increasingly specialized, this issue will only increase in importance. The electricity crisis in California is a prime example of what can occur when vital sectors are disrupted, and when no backup or substitute service or commodity can be feasibly used to overcome the shortfall in large-scale generation. This issue can be expected to gain attention as our reliance on electric power increases. The example also shows that even sectors that do not directly depend on electricity as their primary energy source ͑such as truck and air transportation͒ will be seriously affected by a shortage due to their significant indirect dependencies. Furthermore, these large second and third-level dependencies on energy sources imply that significant environmental impacts may also be hidden within the supply chain, which could be uncovered using a similar approach to what is presented in this paper.
A more far-reaching discovery revealed in this paper is the pattern of multilevel infrastructure interdependencies. Specifically, it is often the case that the dependence between two sectors does not peak until the second or third-level within the supply chain. As previously shown, this is the case for the dependence of most transportation sectors on electric power generation and supply, because their primary direct energy source is liquid fossil fuels. However, the extraction and refining of petroleum products requires a great deal of electricity. The implication for infrastructure management is that the largest sources of risk may not be obvious when looking only at the direct purchases made by an industry. Rather, the dependencies over the entire supply chain must be used to develop an accurate picture of which infrastructures are most vital to a particular sector.
Limitations and Scope of Use
The IO data discussed in this paper is acquired based on a national record of transactions. Therefore, when we use these data and the graphs for purpose of explanation, it is only applicable in examples that are representative of a type of industry or service. It can be used to diagnose one industry's potential risk or vulnerability and identify critical connections and key sectors. However, the purchases, and hence dependencies, of one specific process may vary significantly from the industry national average. The NAICS sectors are also highly aggregated in some instances ͑for example, power generation and supply includes electric power produced from coal, natural gas, nuclear, etc., all of which have very different requirements͒. One must then be careful in applying the model results to a particular company since IO provides information about sectors as a whole, which may or may not be representative of a specific company.
In terms of specific IO data quality issues, one must be cognizant of the fact that the IO data used here is from 1997 and while many sectors will not have changed dramatically, some sectors may have changed due to new technology, policies, or even improved data collection by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. The age of the data are a limiting factor for this analysis because it is only collected every 5 years and requires an additional 5 years of preparation before it is released. Aside from time delays, the IO data has some specific limitations that should be noted. For example, imports and exports are not considered, although newer developments in I-O modeling have made progress in including these transactions ͑Weber and Matthews 2007͒. Also, many com-panies maintain their own fleet of trucks for freight transportation rather than paying for an independent trucking service, which means that the truck transportation sector does not account for all truck transportation required, leading to an underestimate of its importance ͑Facanha and Horvath 2005͒.
As noted in past studies, these economic models also have some inherent limitations. An economic model cannot capture the impacts of regulation and policies that may govern a sector's behavior in the event of a disruption. Also, inoperability is described as a continuous variable, but for some sectors, this may not be a reasonable assumption ͑Haimes and Jiang 2001͒. In reality, each dollar of input is not created equal; some inputs are more vital than others. Electricity may compose a relatively small fraction of a sector's total requirements, but we have come to depend heavily on electricity and in the event of a blackout, that sector may be rendered completely inoperable. The results of this paper suggest that understanding national average dependencies on ͑other͒ critical infrastructures such as power or petroleum can help infrastructure managers and stakeholders use this information to anticipate the ripple effects of shortfalls that occur as the result of disruptions upstream in the supply chain. They are then able to take additional preventative measures in advance to avoid these ripple effects.
The relationships between sectors are also uncertain. Power generation and supply depends on pipeline transportation, but depending on the physical location of the inoperability, power plants may or may not be impacted. A second source of uncertainty is the allocation of a supplier's inoperability. If a supplier experiences a 10% reduction in production, it does not necessarily mean that each demand sector will receive 10% less of the good or service; some may be unaffected and some may be disproportionately affected. This ties into the previous example regarding geographic significance. Furthermore, there are lag times within the links between sectors. If a rail line that delivers coal to a power plant is disrupted and shipments cannot be received, that plant likely has a coal stockpile, and may even have the ability to utilize other fuels while the critical rail line is being repaired. By maintaining a stockpile, the coal-fired power plant operator has helped to prevent the rail inoperability from propagating to other sectors. With more complete information about critical infrastructure interdependencies, appropriate measures can be taken to limit disruption propagation, even when the sector relationships are less obvious.
Ultimately, infrastructure managers will need information beyond economic transactions to effectively manage interdependencyrelated vulnerability, but using IO data via Leontief and Ghosh models, applying them to real-world scenarios, and visualizing the results provides some initial insight into these hidden dependencies. In fact, the analysis shows that critical infrastructure interdependencies follow relatively predictable patterns and these patterns highlight the need to look beyond first-level dependence. Such high-level information can serve as valuable initial guidance in conducting a more in-depth risk assessment for a particular industry or facility that accounts for the complexities and uncertainties inherent in our critical infrastructure systems.
